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I. INTRODUCTION
On or about April 20 of 2010, the mobile offshore oil-drilling rig Deepwater Horizon had
an explosion that caused an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil to spill into the Gulf of Mexico.1
BP Exploration and Production, Inc. (BP), the company that owned the oil well, has been named
a responsible party.2 This paper provides background information on Natural Resource Damage
Assessment (NRDA); a federally imposed process by which a federal or individual state
government agency3 will assess the costs of restoring the Gulf‟s natural resources, then
implement and execute plans for restoration. The costs of this NRDA process of assessment and
restoration may then be recovered in part or in full from BP by an appointed federal agency.
II. BACKGROUND
The BP oil spill has caused environmental damage to the natural resources throughout the
Gulf of Mexico, negatively impacting the ocean and coastal environments surrounding the site of
the spill, as well as the animals and plant life that inhabit these areas. A large portion of these
natural resources are controlled by the federal government. It is the duty of the federal
government to protect these resources, including the plant and animal life, from damage, whether
by regulation and enforcement, or by ensuring the resources are restored in the event that they
are damaged or lost. Damages to the natural resources resulting in a loss of their value, such as
the damages which were the result of the BP oil spill, must be restored, and it is the federal
government‟s duty to ensure that this happens and that the responsible parties are held financially
1 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill - Notice of Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning at 1 (issued on or about Sept. 29, 2010),

available at www.darrp.noaa.gov (last visited Nov. 16, 2010); Official Site of the Deepwater Horizon Unified Command, at
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/04/federal-science-report-details-fate-oil-bp-spill (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
2 Notice of Intent, supra note 1, at 1. See also, 15 C.F.R. § 990.30, definition of responsible parties - “the lessee or permittee of

the area in which the facility is located or the holder of a right to use an[] easement granted under applicable state law or the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1301-1356) for the are in which the facility is located.” Note: There have been
other responsible parties identified by the government, but for the sake of space, BP will represent the responsible party for the
rest of the paper.
3 Note: Again, for the sake of space, there will be no further references to state government agencies. However keep in mind

that the state governments and their appointed agencies are entitled to similar rights and responsibilities as their federal
counterparts under the same federal regulations.
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accountable for the damage the spill has caused. The process by which the damages are
evaluated and the restorations are implemented is called Natural Resource Damage Assessment
(NRDA). The costs incurred by the federal government in undertaking the NRDA process are
recoverable under federal regulation from the responsible party.
The NRDA process is used to determine the values of the lost or damaged resources, and
then to develop a plan, or multiple plans, to restore or replace the damaged resources.4 NRDAs
are an integral part of an array of federal and state regulations aimed at protecting the
environment. The NRDA process that will be employed for the BP oil spill is regulated by the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)5, a federal statute that regulates legal actions resulting from oil
spills that occur in federally controlled oceans and waterways. Under OPA there are several
categories6 of claims for which monetary damages may be recovered in the event of an oil spill,
including: 1) the claims for damages to individual persons, or property owned by private
individuals and other entities, who are then responsible individually for bringing their own
claims against a responsible party; 2) the costs for clean-up and recovery of the oil, a duty that is
assigned to various federal agencies, state agencies and the responsible parties; and 3) the
damages associated with the loss of, and injury to, natural resources, which are determined by
government agencies through the use of NRDAs.7
For the BP oil spill, the lead federal agency in charge of the NRDA process is the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),8 which has been designated a

4 Charles B. Anderson, Damage to Natural Resource and the Costs of Restoration, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 417, 464 (1997).
5 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.
6 Note: For the purposes of this paper, there are three only categories of recovery discussed. However OPA does provide for

other types of recovery not relevant to the subject of this paper. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B-F).
7 Anderson, supra note 4, at 464-66.
8 Notice of Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning, supra note 1, at 1.
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trustee,9 to act on behalf of the federal government to implement NRDA procedures and recover
the costs from BP.10 In order to complete the NRDA process, NOAA will use various methods
of assessing the damages that have occurred in order to determine the value of the lost natural
resources, and to devise and implement a plan to restore or replace the natural resources. NOAA
may then seek reimbursement for the entire NRDA process from the responsible parties, or if
need be, use money from the federally controlled Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLT Fund) to
supplement, or in lieu of recovery.11 However, the maximum contribution the OSLT Fund can
make to NRDA is 500 million dollars.12 Once the restoration of the natural resources is
accomplished and all costs accounted for, the NRDA process in regards to OPA is complete.
III. A HISTORY OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS
A. Pre-Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Sources of Recovery for Natural Resource Damages
Prior to 1990, NRDA claims stemming from oil spills and other similar toxic discharges
were handled either by traditional maritime law, state and local laws, or by various federal
regulations included the Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA)13, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act of 197314, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 197815, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA)16, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan.17

9 15 C.F.R. § 990.30; 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b) definition of trustee - “those officials of the federal and state governments, of Indian

tribes, and of foreign governments, designated under 33 U.S.C. 2706(b) of OPA.”
10 Note: There are also several different state agencies designated as trustees for their respective states for the purpose of

NRDAs of state natural resources not necessarily protected by OPA. They are governed by each states‟ own regulations on
recovery of natural resource damages. See CRS Report R41369 at 1, The 2010 Oil Spill: Natural Resource Damage
Assessment Under the Oil Pollution Act, by Kristina Alexander.
11 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-509). Note: This is a federally controlled fund created to ensure

financial support for oil spill cleanup and NRDA implementation.
12 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A)(ii).
13 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.
14 43 U.S.C. § 1651, et seq.
15 43 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq.
16 42 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.
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This assortment of regulation proved to be inefficient and complicated, as was evidenced by the
lengthy litigation and inefficient use of settlement money and damage awards that arose in the
wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince Edward Sound off the coast of Alaska in 1989.18
Congress attempted to rectify the problems associated with competing, confusing statutes by
passing OPA, which created one uniform law for the regulation of maritime oil spills. Since its
adoption, the improvements OPA is purported to have made have been a subject of much
debate.19 At the very least, OPA has made it clear that it is the sole legal authority concerning
legal action that may be taken in the aftermath of oil spills affecting federally controlled waters
and coastlines, such as the BP oil spill.20
1. Regulation under the Clean Water Act
NRDA regulation was first enacted by the passage of the CWA, as a means by which the
federal government could recover in monetary damages for loss or damage to the nation‟s natural
resources.21 Under the CWA, the United States was named the trustee of federally controlled
natural resources, and the Federal Government was given the authority to delegate to its agencies
the power to seek redress for damages to natural resources caused by, among other things, oil
spills.22 The CWA was the main statutory authority used for the federal claims brought in the

17 40 C.F.R. Part 300.
18 Note: The Exxon Valdez spilled 11 million gallons of oil making it the largest oil spill in the US up to that point. The costs

for clean up and natural resource damages totaled approximately 3 billion dollars. The litigation and settlement process was
criticized by members of government and the oil industry as being to cost inefficient and lengthy. The settlement agreement
resulted in 900 million dollars paid by Exxon for NRDA. The final case addressing the incident concluded 19 years after the
spill in 2008. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct 2605 (2008); CRS Report RL33705 at 1, 21, Oil Spills in U.S.
Coastal Waters: Background, Governance, and Issues for Congress, by Jonathan Ramseur; Grayson Reed Cecil and Nancy
Foster, Natural Resource Injury at Oil Spills: A New Approach, 45 Baylor L. Rev. 423, 424-25 (1993).
19 See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Will Laxity and Collusion Now Come to an End?, The Environmental Forum, Sept.-Oct. 2010,

at 50.
20 See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 990.20; Complaint of MetLife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822 (1st Cir

1997). Note: However, OPA does provide for states to recover under their own regulations where the affected area is under
state control. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)(A).
21 Cecil and Foster, supra note 18, at 423.
22 Id. at 423-24.
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Exxon Valdez litigation.23 The government agencies‟ NRDA process during the Exxon Valdez
litigation was kept secret from the public, as well as from the responsible party, which resulted in
a settlement that was arguably not cost-effective.24 Included in CWA was the 311(k) fund,
which Congress created so that federal agencies could tap it to finance clean-up efforts and
restoration, but the fund was not available to reimburse expenses incurred by the assessment of
the natural resource damages.25 Subsequently, similar funds were created through later federal
legislation, but now all of those funds have been consolidated into the OSLT Fund.26
2. Regulation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act
CERCLA, a statute enacted after the CWA, but before the Exxon Valdez spill, had a
more detailed NRDA regulation regime for evaluating natural resource damages caused by toxic
chemical spills. It is considered to be the main influence on the NRDA regulations incorporated
by OPA. In fact, when OPA‟s NRDA provisions were under judicial review, the court in that
case recognized “the similarity of the two statutory schemes,” thus “find[ing] [CERCLA] cases
instructive” regarding the interpretation of NRDA regulations as they apply to OPA.27
Therefore, the case history of CERCLA‟s NRDA provisions will be given substantial
authoritative weight by the courts when they must interpret OPA‟s NRDA provisions.
3. Legal challenges to CERCLA and the use of Contingent Valuation
The most important case to interpret CERCLA‟s NRDA provisions, as well as other

23 Ramseur, supra note 18, at 7.
24 Cecil and Foster, supra note 18, at 424-25.
25 Id. at 427. Note: The 311 fund could be used to clean up other toxic spills as well, but it was criticized as being inadequate,

so Congress consolidated it with other clean up funds to create the OSLT Fund and that fund is now almost exclusively
regulated by OPA, which has increased the amount of money in the fund through taxes on oil and has extended its funding to
the assessment process. See Ramseur, supra note 18, at 13.
26 Ramseur, supra note 20, at 13.
27 US v. Viking Resources, 607 F.Supp.2d 808, 831 (S.D. Texas 2009).
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provisions of CERCLA, was State of Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior (DOI).28
The most relevant aspect of that case regarding NRDAs, was the petitioners‟ challenge to the
Department of Interior‟s decision to allow the use of a method of NRDA known as contingent
valuation (CV) as a way to determine the value of natural resources. CV is used as a way to
ascribe value to natural resources when there is no available market value for the natural
resource, and no similar resources exist that have a value for comparison.29 It entails use of
hypothetical scenarios posed to individuals about the monetary values they would ascribe to
these resources, and from their responses a value is determined.30 This value can then be used to
calculate the monetary damages owed for the loss or damage done to the natural resource.
CERCLA‟s NRDA provision allowing the use of CV was challenged in Ohio because,
according to the petitioners, CV was “inharmonious with common law damage assessment
principles, [] considerably less than a „best available procedure,‟ [and] [the] extension of
CERCLA‟s rebuttable presumption to CV assessments [was] arbitrary and capricious.”31 The
court held that the “strictures of the common law” do not apply to CERCLA, that use of CV
methodology “in the [(NRDA)] regulations was entirely proper,” and that there was “nothing
arbitrary or irrational about the rebuttable presumption conferred upon . . . utilizing CV
methodology.”32 Thus, the use of CV has been met with criticism from its inception, and

28 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir 1989), a review of regulations promulgated by the DOI pursuant to CERCLA governing recoverable

damages from responsible parties of leaks of oil and hazardous substances. The court held: the limitation of damages
recoverable by the trustees for harmed natural resources was contrary to intent of Congress and invalid, the record would be
remanded to DOI for clarification of its interpretation of its regulations about CERCLA natural resource damage provisions
and the applicability to private owned land, and regulation prescribing hierarchy of methodologies by which lost use value
could be measured that relied on market values when market values were available was not a reasonable interpretation of
CERCLA.
29 Cecil and Foster, supra note 18, at 424-25.
30 Id.
31 Ohio, 880 F.2d at 476.
32 Id. at 476, 478, 480.
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continues to come under criticism to this day, in both the courtroom and academic publications.33
Although the use of CV has been rejected under the circumstances of a specific case34, the use of
CV as a method of NRDA has yet to be rejected by the courts.
B. Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Purpose, Provisions and Legal Ramifications
In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the aforementioned statutory regimes came
under fire as ineffective and inefficient, which resulted in wasted compensation intended for
restoration to damaged natural resources, and lengthy trials that wasted too much time and
taxpayer money.35 In light of the many criticisms, the United States Congress passed OPA.
Congress intended to provide a means by which the responsible party could be held accountable
for proper oil clean-up and removal, individuals could be fairly compensated for their losses, and
natural resources could be restored to pre-spill conditions, with as little litigation as possible.36
OPA was intended to be the one clear authority on maritime oil spills by which these goals could
be attained.37 Whether OPA has actually accomplished this goal is still disputed to this day.38
However, since the BP spill will be the largest oil spill since the enactment of OPA, it will
probably prove to be the most significant and revealing test of the purported improvements.
Through OPA, Congress stated that natural resource damages were recoverable in the
event of an oil spill, and delegated the authority to the President to author the specific regulations

33 See, e.g., State of Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated Transp., 1991 WL 22479 at *18-19; Allan Kanner and Tibor Nagy,

Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural Resource Damage Actions, 30 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 417, 433-438 (2005); Murray
B. Rutheford, Jack L. Knetsch, and Thomas C. Brown, Assessing Environmental Losses: Judgments of Importance and
Damage Schedules, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 51, 66-69 (1998).
34 Southern Refrigerated, 1991 WL 22479 at *18-19. Note: This is the only case as of 2005 to have rejected the admissibility of

CV. Research as of this date found no other examples.
35 Ramseur, supra note 18, at 8-9. See also Cecil and Foster, supra note 18, at 424-25.
36 Alexander, supra note 10, at 1-2.
37 Ramseur, supra note 18, at 9.
38 See, e.g., Keith B. Letourneau and Wesley T. Welmaker, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Federal Judicial Interpretation

Through the End of the Millennium, 12 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 147, 223-25 (2000); Anderson, supra note 4, at 484.
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that would provide for the recovery of those damages.39 The President subsequently delegated
his authority to write and regulate the NRDA provisions of OPA to NOAA.40 In 1996, NOAA
published its “final rule” on the use of NRDAs as they applied to OPA.41 The provisions of the
final rule on NRDA include the guidelines by which a federally appointed trustee will assess and
recover the damages resulting from the oil spill from the responsible party.42 Invoking similar
language as provided by the CERCLA‟s NRDA provisions, NOAA‟s final rule states that there
are several methods available that may be employed by the trustee in order to determine how
much a responsible party owes for the damages to and loss of natural resources, many of which
are listed in the appendix to the final rule, including the use of CV.43
1. Provisions of the Final Rule
i. The Rebuttable Presumption.
NOAA‟s final rule on NRDA has several provisions that will be quite significant to the
BP spill. One such provision states that once the trustee has established that their assessments
have addressed the “type and scale of restoration appropriate for a particular injury”; that the
“additional cost[s] of a more complex procedure [are] reasonably related to the [] increase in
quality and/or quantity of relevant information”; and that the assessments are “reliable and
valid”; then the valuations determined by the trustee based on the NRDAs will have the benefit
of a rebuttable presumption in court.44 This means that should a responsible party challenge a
trustee‟s decision regarding any aspect of the NRDA process, or the use of any method of
valuation, the responsible party will have the burden of proving that the trustee‟s decisions are

39 General Electric v. The United States Department of the Interior, 128 F.3d 767, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 990.24, 990.27, 990.40-66.
43 See Letourneau and Welmaker, supra note 38, at 90-91
44 15 C.F.R. § 990.13; 15 C.F.R. § 990.27.
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clearly erroneous or the assessment has obviously deviated from the guidelines of the final rule.
So, unless there is credible evidence rebutting the presumption that the trustee‟s decisions have
satisfied the guidelines of the final rule, the decisions regarding the methods used and value
determinations of the assessment will be valid, and the costs will be enforced against the
responsible party.
One commentator, however, has questioned whether this presumption will actually apply
to the use of CV as an assessment technique under OPA because of subsequent changes in
evidence law,45 but as of yet there has been no court decision denying the trustee the benefit of
the presumption for deciding to use CV as a method of NRDA. Nevertheless, the trustee still
must act within other federal regulations. For instance, when implementing a plan for restoring
the natural resource, the trustee must do so in a way that does not violate the protections
accorded to other aspects of the environment by other federal laws.46
ii. The NRDA Process under the Final Rule - Phase One
NOAA‟s Final Rule has divided the NRDA process into three phases. In Phase One, the
Pre-Assessment Phase, the trustee determines whether there is jurisdiction under OPA to pursue
an investigation into the need for restoration projects, and if they do have jurisdiction, whether it
is appropriate to do so.47 To do this, a trustee must show that an incident has occurred that does
not fall under a permitted exception, and that the extent or severity of the damages to natural
resources cannot be remedied by clean-up procedures alone.48 The trustee may opt to collect

45 See Letourneau and Welmaker, supra note 38, at 196-200, which argues that the Supreme Court decision in Kumho Tire Co.

v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), has put a predicate requirement on expert testimony, such as a trustee, requiring the expert
to pass a reliability evaluation by the judge; therefore, a decision by a trustee to use CV that does not pass this evaluation will
not entitle that decision to the rebuttable presumption outlined in OPA.
46 15 C.F.R. § 990.23.
47 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.40-42.
48 Id.
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data to show this, for which it may recover costs from the responsible party.49 Once a
determination has been made, the trustee will then post a Notice of Intent to Conduct Restoration
Planning, which essentially lets the responsible party know that the government will be
proceeding further with its NRDAs, allowing the party a chance to participate should it choose to
do so, as it will be financially responsible for the trustee‟s decisions and evaluations.50 After the
Notice of Intent has been issued, the trustee must open an administrative record so the public is
aware of the trustee‟s decisions, and has a chance to comment on the process.51 This provision
was likely a response to criticisms of the Exxon Valdez NRDA settlements, where the NRDA
process was kept a secret from the public, and resulted in a controversial settlement between the
government and the responsible parties for the damages done to natural resources.
iii. NRDA under the Final Rule - Phase Two
Phase Two of the final rule is the Restoration Planning Phase, which is divided into two
sub-phases. During the first sub-phase, the trustee must develop a process for evaluating the
scope of the damage.52 This sub-phase is where CV method may be used. This sub-phase also
entails the determination of the type of damage that has occurred, and whether a causal
connection can be made between the spilled oil and the damaged resource.53 The trustee must
elaborate on both the geographical extent of the damages and the degree of harm suffered.54 In
the next sub-phase, the trustee must determine the type of restoration actions that are possible,
and decide which would be best for rehabilitating and replacing the natural resources.55 In doing
so, a series of guidelines must be followed in order to ensure that the restoration plan selected is
49 15 C.F.R. § 990.43.
50 15 C.F.R. § 990.44.
51 15 C.F.R. § 990.45.
52 15 C.F.R. § 990.51.
53 Id.
54 15 C.F.R. § 990.52.
55 15 C.F.R. § 990.53.
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as cost-efficient as possible, while at the same time ensuring the greatest level of recovery of
natural resources.56 The plans that have satisfied these guidelines and are selected by the trustee
will then be compiled into a Draft Plan, which will also be published for public comment.57
iv. NRDA Under the Final Rule - Phase Three
In the final phase, Phase Three, or the Restoration Implementation Phase, the
administrative record is closed and a demand is then presented to the responsible party to comply
with the Draft Plan.58 The responsible party then has 90 days to challenge the plan, begin
implementation or compensate the government, or it risks incurring further liability.59 However,
should they refuse to comply, the government will then undertake the efforts outlined by the
Draft Plan, and it can take the responsible party to court in order to recover the costs it incurs, as
well as to potentially receive other damage awards.60 The trustee‟s decisions, having the benefit
of the presumption, are difficult to invalidate, unless some outrageous deviation from acceptable
NRDA procedures can be shown.61 Whether or not the responsible party implements the plan,
challenges within the 90 days, or compensates the government, the NRDA process will still only
be concluded once the conditions of the natural resources have reached their pre-spill status.62
2. The Liability Cap Provision of OPA
Another important provision in OPA has imposed a cap on the monetary amount that the
responsible parties may pay out for NRDAs.63 Congress included this cap in OPA, perhaps

56 Id. See, also, 15 C.F.R. § 990.54.
57 15 C.F.R. § 990.55.
58 15 C.F.R. § 990.61-62.
59 15 C.F.R. § 990.62; 15 C.F.R. § 990.64.
60 15 C.F.R. § 990.64.
61 15 C.F.R. § 990.13; Letourneau and Welmaker, supra note 38, at 191-92.
62 15 C.F.R. § 990.10.
63 33 U.S.C. § 2704.
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influenced by the concerns of the industry about unpredictable awards.64 When an oil spill
involves an offshore drilling rig, as the BP oil spill did, the maximum amount recoverable from a
responsible party for non-clean up costs, including NRDA, is 75 million dollars.65 However, the
liability cap provision provides that if the responsible party is found to be grossly negligent, to
have acted willfully, or in violation of a federal statute, the cap will not apply.66 This cap will
not be applied to the amount paid by the responsible party for damages available under state law
claims or clean-up costs.67 There has been some public concern that the 75 million dollar cap
will fall short of the amount needed to restore the natural resources, which has led to
congressional debate over increasing the limit, but so far no new regulation has been
implemented.68
3. OPA and the Courts
The only significant legal challenge to OPA regarding NRDA was in the General Electric
v. the United States Department of Interior69 case, where private interest parties challenged
various provisions of NOAA‟s final rule in accordance with an OPA clause allowing for
administrative review of NOAA‟s final rule provisions within 90 days of its promulgation.70 The
relevant challenges offered by the petitioners were their arguments against OPA‟s granting of a
rebuttable presumption to the trustee‟s decisions and findings, and to NOAA‟s decision to

64 See, e.g., Exxon v. Baker, 128 S.Ct at 2626-27; Note: The caps also apply to other monetary awards not discussed in this

paper, such as loss of subsistence use damages. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B).
65 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3).
66 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c).
67 Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 2718; Ramseur, supra note 18, at 7.
68 See Alexander, supra note 10, at 14; Article, Deepwater Horizon: Updating the OPA, The Environmental Forum, Sept.-Oct.

2010, at 46.
69 128 F.3d 767, a petition by industrial parties for review of NOAA‟s final rule. Regarding the rule, the court held: the rule

presumption was permissible; it properly allowed use of CV; it‟s authorization for removal of residual oil suffered from a lack
of decision making; it properly held responsible parties accountable for monitoring and oversight costs; it need not preclude
recovery of passive use values; and it did not violate a responsible party‟s rights to seek contribution from other parties.
70 Id. at 771.
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include CV as a method of NRDA.71 The court reviewed these provisions under an “arbitrary
and capricious” standard, meaning that the rules are to be upheld unless the court finds that
NOAA‟s regulations had no rational connection to the subject they were intended to address. 72
This legal hurdle is rather difficult to overcome, and not surprisingly, the court upheld the
validity of both of these provisions.73
The court recognized the fact that CV has been a source of controversy, but it would not
go so far as to say that the decision to include it as a method of assessment was “arbitrary and
capricious.”74 In developing the regulations, NOAA had commissioned a panel, which included
two Nobel laureates, to determine the appropriateness of using CV in damage assessment.75 The
panel “concluded that if properly conducted under strict guidelines, the technique can convey
useful and reliable information, . . . „reliable enough to be the starting point of a judicial process
of damage assessment.‟”76 The challengers argued that since there were no strict guidelines in
the final rule regarding the use of CV, NOAA had disregarded the panel‟s recommendation, and
therefore had acted arbitrarily and irrationally.77 The court however, persuaded by NOAA‟s
response, reasoned that since the provision in the final rule did not require the use of CV, but
merely approved it as one of a number of methods that may be used for NRDAs, that its
inclusion in the provision was not arbitrary and irrational.78 The court explained that the proper
time to challenge the use of CV would only come about in a specific case where it had been used

71 Id. at 771-72.
72 Id. at 771.
73 Id. at 772-74.
74 Id. at 772-73.
75 Id. at 772.
76 Id. at 772 (citation omitted).
77 Id. at 773.
78 Id. at 773-74.
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as a method of damage assessment.79 Thus, the door was left open for a responsible party, for
instance BP, to challenge the particular valuations made by a trustee based on CV in its NRDAs,
but could not succeed by merely challenging the use of CV as an NRDA method in general.
IV. NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS AND THE BP OIL SPILL:
THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS AND THEIR LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Almost immediately after the spill, BP was named the responsible party and began
working on clean-up activities alongside the Coast Guard and other government agencies.80
Despite criticisms of BP for downplaying the extent of the spill in the days after the event, and
the length of time it took to cap the leaky well, there has been little public criticism of BP‟s
willingness to cooperate with government requests.81 Clean-up efforts have yet to conclude, but
when the efforts do cease and the costs are tallied, there may be some litigation between the
government and BP. BP may make the argument that the clean-up costs the government seeks to
impose upon BP could actually be NRDA costs, the latter being subject to the monetary cap,
while the former has no such restriction, thereby lowering the amount of BP‟s clean up costs.
The potential for dispute over the difference between clean-up costs and damage assessment
costs is one criticism that has been leveled against OPA as one of its vagaries.82
As for the NRDA process itself, the Notice of Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning
was presented on September 29, 2010, signifying the conclusion of the Pre-Assessment Phase of
the final rule.83 NOAA, as the trustee, has begun the Restoration Planning Phase and continues

79 Id.
80 See Alexander, supra note 10, at 6; Press Release, BP Initiates Response to Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, released April 22, 2010,

available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7061490.
81 See, e.g., Rebecca M. Bratspies, Regulating by Regulators, Not Industry, The Environmental Forum, Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 48;

Russel V. Randle, Contingency Planning - Lessons Learned, The Environmental Forum, Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 51.
82 Anderson, supra note 4, at 490.
83 Notice of Intent, supra note 1.
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to collect data in order to develop Restoration Plans for the area.84 From all indications, BP has
been complying with the process.85 There has been no indication as of yet as to whether CV will
be or is being used as a method to value damaged natural resources, but should it be used, it is
likely that any costs based on the use of CV will be challenged by BP, as CV valuations have
been successfully challenged in at least one case in the past, albeit under CERCLA.86 Further, if
it is indeed true, as posited earlier, that CV will not be entitled to the benefit of OPA‟s rebuttable
presumption, then the chances of BP successfully invalidating a valuation determination based
on CV greatly improves.87
Interestingly, there have also been reports that private environmental organizations are
criticizing the data collection techniques employed by NOAA as being ineffective and likely to
produce inaccurate NRDAs.88 These groups allege that the techniques fail to properly identify
damaged natural resources, and that this benefits BP by under-representing the amount of
damage that has been done.89 These organizations are not likely to have any type of legal action
to enforce their claims, because the trustee, and in some cases the responsible party, will be the
only entities legally entitled to evaluate and determine the damages to natural resources, so
presumably the ability to comment on the public record will be the only redress these
organizations have for their assertions.
The role that the monetary cap will have on the NRDA damage award is uncertain. BP
has already committed 20 billion dollars to a fund that is managed by an independent firm, but
that money has been reserved for settlements and liability awards for individual claims only, and
84 Press Release for Notice of Intent, available at http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
85 Id.
86 See Southern Refrigerated, 1991 WL 22479 at *18-19.
87 See Letourneau and Welmaker, supra note 38, at 199-200.
88 Rick Jervais, Research Teams Find Oil on Bottom of Gulf, USAToday (Oct. 25, 2010), available at http://www.usatoday.
89

com/news/nation/2010-10-25-oilresearch25_ST_N.htm.
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will not be used as a source of recovery for the costs and determinations of the NRDAs.90 There
has been growing public concern that the 75 million dollar cap will not cover the NRDA costs
and the costs of restoration, which has led to some discussion in Congress about increasing the
liability cap, but nothing further has developed.91 However, the cap would not be applicable if
BP is found to be grossly negligent, to have acted willfully, or in violation of a federal statute, so
the issue may be moot, depending on the government‟s official investigation into the events
leading up to the explosion.
According to NOAA representatives, most of the compensation for NRDA and
implementation costs in the past has been obtained through negotiations and settlements with the
responsible party.92 These negotiations, unlike the NRDA process of the final rule, are usually
privileged, and not subject to public input.93 However, they often include a reopener clause as
one of the conditions of the settlement, which would allow the government to recover more
money should the amount settled upon prove to be deficient.94 If this trend continues, BP and
the federal government may merely agree on an amount projected to cover the cost of
restoration, which would reduce the legal costs on both sides, and result in BP‟s dismissal from
the NRDA and restoration efforts.
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